Arthur C. Clarke Lectures

University of Moratuwa, Colombo, Sri Lanka 1992

The Global Market For Information Satellites

Dr. Joseph V. Charyk
Founding President of the Comsat Corporation

Arthur Clarke's 1945 vision of an emerging world of satellite communications was, of course, noted with interest but hardly a belief that such a concept could become a reality in anything approaching an early time frame. As a matter of fact, Arthur himself once told me that he did not visualize such a concept becoming a reality much before the year 2000. There were two big questions. One related to the kind of launch capabilities needed to launch substantial payloads into synchronous orbit. The second big concern was the feasibility of achieving reasonably long operating lifetimes in orbit for the satellites themselves. The latter seemed particularly challenging since the payloads would have to be quite large and the operating components (such as vacuum tubes) would require complex service, repair and component replacement missions in order to achieve anything approaching the rather long operating lifetimes that would be necessary for such a system to be economically practical. The development of the transistor and the race to achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability changed all that.

The 1939 World's Fair in New York has for some time served as an example of the hazards of predicting the course of future technical developments. This Fair was intended to be a portent of technical developments to come and, as one example, highlighted the advent of television. Totally missing from this vision, however, were nuclear energy, jet propulsion and solid state devices. These three missing elements, in retrospect, have had a dominating effect on the world in the last 50 years. Recently at the State Department in Washington the second award of the Draper Prize was made to Sir Frank Whittle and Hans von Ohain for their independent and almost simultaneous development of the jet engine. The Charles Stark Draper Prize was established through an endowment to the National Academy of Engineering as a recognition of outstanding engineering contributions on an international basis. Interestingly enough, the first award of the Draper Prize was made in 1989 to Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce for their independent and almost simultaneous development of the monolithic integrated circuit, the "brain" in all modern electronic equipment. Thus, the first two awards of the Draper Prize have gone to two of the key missing elements at the 1939 World's Fair.

However, there is a fourth element that has changed and will continue to change the world in which we live in a very dramatic way. Arthur Clarke's famous 1945 paper was the prelude. This fourth element is what may be called the "information" satellite. Sub-elements of "information" satellites include such items as communication satellites, weather satellites, earth observation satellites, reconnaissance satellites, signal intelligence satellites and sensing satellites. These information satellites have already irrevocably opened up and changed the nature of the world and are making the formation and operation of closed societies an impossibility. They are undoubtedly the most potent force in achieving the global village of which Arthur has written about so often.

Information satellites are responsible for what we have seen first develop in Eastern Europe and then in what was previously the Soviet Union. These capabilities also directly played a key role in the failure of the attempted coup against President Gorbachev and thus in a reaffirmation of the move towards democratization in this critical area of the world. On August 23, David Hoffman, a Washington Post writer, wrote: "Antennas and telephones, satellite dishes and fax machines became the tools by which the United States and other countries let Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and the others resisting the coup in Leningrad, the Baltics and elsewhere know they were being supported in the outside world. In turn, the channels let Yeltsin and his backers provide important information to the outside. The blanket of global communications made it impossible to hide the public opposition to the coup leadership, although authorities had shut down most of the Soviet Media." The speed of information transmission, processing and distribution on a global scale and the utilization of such data through diverse, simple and inexpensive devices have influenced and will on an escalating basis influence the world of tomorrow.

To understand recent events it is important to recall the dramatic series of events that have occurred over the last 30 to 50 years which have brought us to where we are today in terms of information satellites.

The first sub-category of information satellites is, of course, the communication satellite. It has been responsible for the fall of what some have called "communications colonialism" and the dawn of "communications liberalism." Clearly a lot has changed in thirty years. To communicate from one country in South America to another, even a neighbor, in the mid-1960s meant that the message almost invariably was routed via New York. From an English-speaking African country to another such country, you were routed via London. If the countries were French speaking, then Paris was very likely to be the hub. Not only that but, for such communication, wireless radio was the only means. It meant poor quality, uncertain contact, long delays and high cost. Telegraph and telex were the main modes of communication.

The first telephone cable across the Atlantic had gone into operation only a few years earlier and it had a capacity of only 36 voice circuits and, of course, no television capability. International communications were dominated by the British, the French and the United States. One of the first political problems with which we had to deal at COMSAT in 1964 and 1965 was the concern about the impact that communication satellites might have on this structure and the investments in existing and planned non-satellite facilities. The World Administrative Radio Conference in 1963 was critical in that without appropriate allocation of frequencies for communication satellite use, no global commercial usage would have been possible. There were many hours of discussions with delegates from the developing world to educate them on the potential of satellites. It was very important to correct impressions they had been given about how unrealistic satellites were. It was important to convince them that early economic implementation of a satellite system was indeed possible and to assure them that the allocation of frequencies on a shared basis as proposed would not adversely affect their planned microwave systems. Furthermore, satellites would provide an alternative, if so desired, to their use of HF radio as the principal international communication mode.

One of the key issues was the use of HF radio. Leaders from developing countries needed to be reassured that their HF use would be unaffected. They needed to learn how their experience with satellite communications might well lead them to conclude that further planned expansion of HF facilities and additional frequency allocations for this purpose would be unnecessary. Today these countries are the backbone of the INTELSAT satellite system and also its greatest supporters. Developing countries are the users who most depend on INTELSAT satellites for the vast majority of their international communication needs.

Within COMSAT the fact that six out of the fifteen directors were representing United States' international communications common carriers produced a most unusual situation in that the interests of these companies and the interests of COMSAT diverged on many issues. There is really no other legislatively mandated situation of this type and it might be useful to consider how this situation arose and how it impacted the initiation of global commercial communication satellite services.

The stimulus to space technology development provided by Sputnik in 1957 led to serious consideration and implementation of programs that could have a significant impact on the national security needs of the United States as well as on commercial opportunities. In those early days, the Department of Defense, NASA and private industry, notably AT&T, Hughes and RCA all undertook initiatives to assess the feasibility and economics of communication satellite services. The results were the dramatic demonstration of trans-oceanic television through AT&T's TELSTAR satellite, a medium altitude satellite and Hughes demonstration through SYNCOM confirmed the potential simplicity and economy of the use of synchronous satellites.

The early work on these developments emphasized the need for a national policy determination on how the commercial development of such satellite systems should proceed. The Federal Communications Commission working with the US international communications carriers concluded with a recommendation that such systems should be owned and operated by these carriers. This position was supported and adopted by Senator Kerr, one of the most powerful legislators in Washington. Some legislators in the Senate and in the House of Representatives felt that because most space research had been government supported, the government should own and operate such systems. A third group felt that such systems should be privately owned and operated and that a new corporation should be established for this purpose and shares in the company made available to interested private citizens.

President Kennedy's administration was deeply concerned that the Kerr proposal would further enhance the overwhelming dominant role of AT&T and that many would view such a solution as a giveaway of taxpayer supported research to a potential "monopolist." It did not feel that government should be in a commercial communication business but had concerns that a new private company on its own without any experience in communications and as a minimum not viewed sympathetically by the existing carriers could well not be successful. Out of meetings involving Senator Kerr, the carriers and the executive branch of the government emerged the idea of a new company but one in which the carriers would be able to have a 50 percent interest, while the general public would be permitted to own shares in the other half. Each category would elect six directors and the President of the United States would appoint three. It was an idea not very pleasing to most of the parties but such a proposal was presented to the Congress as the Administration position with the clear indicator to the carriers and others that the consequences of a failure to support such legislation could be of some significance.

The bill introduced in the Senate had many flaws and unclear aspects but the general assumption was that these could be corrected when the final compromises were negotiated in conference between the House and the Senate. However, a rather unanticipated development took place. Opponents to the proposed legislation in the Senate proceeded to move towards filibuster actions which would block enactment of any other legislation and protract indefinitely the debate on the satellite bill. Such filibusters had become relatively common but almost solely aimed at the enactment of Civil Rights legislation violently opposed by most of the southern senators. A limitation on debate or "cloture" was permissible under Senate rules but on civil rights matters the necessary votes to so limit debate could normally not be attained. It appeared that the only way in which the communication satellite bill could be passed and other vital business resumed was for cloture to be invoked and for the first time leading southern senators led by Senator Kerr voted for culture. Debate terminated and the Senate bill was passed. There were two important consequences. The first was that the House representatives in the conference would have to accept the Senate version in toto. Otherwise, the revised bill would have to go back to the Senate with the assured generation of a new series of debates. The other was that for the first time a large group of southern senators had voted for closure and would have to be able to justify that such action was justifiable in the case of some relatively inconsequential satellite bill but was not justifiable when dealing with human rights.

The Kennedy Administration viewed this as such an important aspect that a very senior official of the Justice Department has stated that without the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, civil rights legislation in the near period thereafter would not have been possible. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was passed and the new organization came into being in March of 1963 with a charter to establish in conjunction with other countries a global communications satellite system to serve the needs of all countries, especially the underdeveloped, and to hopefully, through its creation, contribute to world peace and understanding. Three key issues had to be addressed almost immediately, viz, the acquisition of capital, decisions regarding the type of system to be attempted to be built, and the type of international arrangements that would be sought. The first issue could not really be addressed without dealing with the other two since the writing of a prospectus for the issuance of stock required information on them.

The potential carrier stockholders advised COMSAT officials to seek bilateral international agreements similar to the ones employed in international cable programs. Of rather serious implication was the input from AT&T that Bell Labs data suggested that synchronous satellites would probably not be usable for voice communications because the associated time delay would likely prove to be unacceptable to their customers. Early studies had already shown that medium altitude systems of the Telstar type would be very expensive involving many satellites and complex ground equipment. Such a system could be utilized by the major nations who could afford multiple expensive ground stations but would be unrealistic for most nations and thus would perpetuate the era of communications colonialism.

The record carriers also felt that the time delay associated with synchronous satellites would be incompatible with their equipment and modification would be expensive and uncertain. On the other hand, a synchronous system could be established with a few satellites in a near time frame and would require relatively simple and inexpensive ground terminals. Furthermore, the Syncom voice demonstrations at the World Administrative Radio Conference were enthusiastically applauded by telecommunications officials from most of the participating nations. On the other hand, synchronous satellites were more complex, as were the launch and orbit insertion requirements. Shorter satellite lifetimes and lower successful orbit injection rates could dramatically alter the system economics.

Nevertheless, all of us at COMSAT were drawn to the internationally attractive aspects of a synchronous system as our confidence in being able to deal with the technical issues grew. AT&T, our only serious initial customer, made it clear that they could only agree to lease satellite circuits if satisfactory telephone service would be achieved. We took the
gamble that we could solve the technical problems and that commercial usage would follow. The decision was made to bunch a derivative of the Syncom satellite and call if the "experimental-operational" satellite, the former term to apply if we were wrong, the latter if global communications by satellite was to be a near-term reality. The rest is history. Early Bird in 1963, with a capacity of about 240 two-way telephone circuits or one television channel, became commercially operational a few months after its launch in April 1965. It had twice the capacity of the latest telephone cable across the Atlantic and for the first time could tie continents together for television viewing. The growth in capacity and flexibility and the improvement in the economics of earth terminals. These attributes have made possible the transition from the vision of a global system we had in 1963 to the reality of today.

Many people have sought to quantify the magnitude of the changes in communications terms over this time span. Figure 1 shows a table of satellite capacities from Early Bird to an Advanced Concept Satellite embodying on-board processing and phased-array antennas that could be used in the next generation of INTELSAT satellites.

Such a satellite would contemplate the usage of some recent advances in on-board technology both at RF and at baseband. Examples of TF technologies are MMIC switch matrices, multiple steered beam active phased array antennas and applications of new developments in devices and processing. Baseband technologies include regeneration, bulk demand/demux and digital baseband switches. The table seeks to compare capacities for a small earth station (G/T=22.7 db/K) and a larger station (G/T=35 db/K). The carrier-to-noise ratios (C/N) show the impact of improvements in this technology in this time span.

Satellite efficiency is, of course, crucially dependent on satellite lifetime. This was one of the most serious concerns in regard to synchronous satellites and we estimated that Early Bird could have a useful operating life of about 18 months. It proved to be an ultra-conservative estimate. Our first Marisat satellite was estimated to have a useful life of three years. It has been used for five times that long. Generally the limiting factor turns out to be the fuel available on-board the satellite for attitude control and station-keeping. Even here, lifetimes can be significantly increased by adding a simple tracking capability to earth terminals and permitting the satellite to migrate north and south over the equator and thus describing a figure eight-type pattern. This so-called "COMSAT maneuver" technique is being used by COMSAT in television distribution services in the United States. In the process they are using satellites that would otherwise have reached the end of their useful lives. In seeking to look at improvements in satellite efficiency, therefore, lifetime is key and the percent of satellite weight available for on-board fuel is important. From Early Bird to the latest satellites, the percentage of wet mass to dry mass plus fuel has improved from about one-third to close to 60 percent. Figure 2 shows calculated changes in the cost of the "dry" mass for the generation of INTELSAT satellites. It seems to indicate that cost per unit mass has leveled out and that major changes in the future are unlikely with present techniques.

(graphic unavailable at this time)

However, in the envisioned advanced technology satellite employing array antennas and on-board processing and operating in a distributed earth station environment, a further major reduction on the order of a factor of 3 appears possible in a first generation satellite employing these features. Such a satellite would also set us out on a new learning curve that perhaps could yield an improvement of perhaps ten-to-one, as compared to INTELSAT VII.

To look at total costs, launch vehicle costs need to be added. Here their results are muddier because of an inability to sort out true costs in 1991 dollars. The much-heralded cost savings of the shuttle have never been achieved and payload delivery costs have realistically been heavily subsidized or, as a minimum, cost allocation calculations have been questionable. Even so, it is clear that the manned space shuttle vehicle is an unsuitable, expensive way to place payloads such as communication satellites into orbit. One of the tragic US policy mistakes of a decade ago was that of requiring all payloads to fly on the shuttle and to direct the phase out of expendable launch vehicles together with the non-decision to proceed to develop an efficient, reliable unmanned launch vehicle for payloads of this type. COMSAT and INTELSAT fought hard against the implementation of such a policy but without success. Within INTELSAT this led to the search for launch alternatives which, of course, led to ARIANE. It is fortunate for INTELSAT that an alternative to the space shuttle was available to ensure the integrity and growth of the INTELSAT system.

It is clear that today we now talk less and less about voice circuits as a measure of capacity but deal more logically with bits/sec and the costs for same. As we move rapidly from analog to digital for all forms of communications we enter a new era where distinctions between types of information become meaningless as far as transmission is concerned. Voice, data and television are simply bits of information. Data processing at both ends translates them into the desired form and, if necessary, adds security. In the past we distinguished between voice and data service. These services were organized and even regulated differently. To a significant extent, however, advancing technology will render such distinctions more and more meaningless as digital communications services covers every application.

Advances in information processing have in the last 50 years been even more dramatic than those in communications. It might be appropriate, therefore, to examine these advances briefly and to get a better feel for the implications of these advances and the dramatic impact they have made and will make in our daily lives and in global relationships.

(graphic unavailable at this time)

By 1926 we had teletype at 50 bits/sec and HF radio at 300 bits/sec. Coaxial cable in the 1950's first used for analog telephone had 4 MHz of bandwidth and theoretically could have supported 8 Mbits/sec. Satellite system digital transmission first occurred in 1970 using 800 64 kbit/sec. Satellite system digital transmission first occurred in 1970 using 800 64 kbit/sec channels for single-channel-per-carrier service in a 36 MHz bandwidth transponder. In 1985, 120 Mbit/sec quadrature phase shift keyed (QPSK) time-division-multiple-access service was introduced in 72 MHz INATELSAT V transponders. In 1990, 140 Mbits/s coded octal PSK (COPSK) was tested in 72 MHz transpnders and later extended to 155.5 Mbits/sec.

These rates will soon be introduced in the INTELSAT system. Satellite transmission at Gbit/sec rates using wideband transponders and spot beams at Ka band, such as those on the NASA Advanced Communication Technology Satellite, should become commercial in the near future. On the cable side, fiber light guides carrying 240 Mbits/sec were introduced in 1986 on TAT-8. The next generation raises this to 2.4 Gbit/sec and fiber light guide rates of 10 Gbits/sec loom ahead as soliton transmission with light pumped amplification becomes feasible commercially.

Figure 8 shows the dramatic changes in speech transmission rates from the early digital transmission of speech by delta modulation in 1950 yielding 100 kbits/sec to low bit rate vocoders in 1990 operating at rates of 4800 and 9600 bits/sec and suitable for mobile communication services.

(graphic unavailable at this time)

What does all this mean in layman terms? Basically that we are rapidly approaching an era when any kind of information can be readily available to anyone anywhere and where individuals or groups or mass audiences can interact with each other in any form of information exchange easily, quickly and economically using simple, mobile and light-weight devices. Such a capability dramatically changes the nature of the world and does greatly complicate if not make impossible the control and operation of closed societies or systems. It has the potential for the elimination of illiteracy and for the improvement of the means and the quality of life on a global basis. The power of the information age which we are now entering might prove more profound than the industrial age, which we studied in our history courses.

Now that the technology context has been reviewed, the institutional issues must be addressed. In this case, the history regarding the creating of INTELSAT is important.

It was clear from the outset that our carrier friends' recommendation that we seek to use the cable rout of bilateral arrangements as the basis for INTELSAT was unrealistic. Satellites, by their very nature, were multilateral. In addition, they had a high political visibility which meant that foreign office interest in any such arrangements would be high and that international arrangements for satellites were too important to be left solely in the hands of the communicators.

Very quickly then we found ourselves in a complex negotiation with the major European nations on a communication and foreign office level where the Europeans concluded early that they should seek to negotiate as a single entity. Among the key issues were the provision of hardware to a possible system, the timeframe for the first satellite, the funding mechanism, the organizational structure, and the voting arrangements. On certain points we stated we were not prepared to negotiate. First, procurement would be on the basis of best equipment at the best prices. This could not be an industry subsidization and training program. It must lead to a communication system that would be the best that could be built under the most favorable economic terms. Our charter required us to move ahead as quickly as possible and prolonged consideration of all satellite matters was unacceptable.

Here AT&T played a very key role in informing the European communication entities that the system would proceed with or without their participation. In particular, AT&T indicated it would support the undertaking, that the timing was right and that the fledgling new Corporation would easily be able to raise the funds necessary for the task. This turned a discussion into a much more urgent international negotiation.

On structure and voting our position was that ownership and voice in the new organization should be in proportion to use and key decisions would have to be made on this basis. With Europe acting with a single voice it was clear that the full international aspect of a satellite system should be tapped as soon as possible and the views of other countries solicited. Accordingly, simultaneous discussions proceeded with Canada, Australia, and Japan. This trio of nations played a key role in accelerating the pace of discussions.

We also met with the Soviets in this timeframe. They made it clear they did not subscribe to the basic principles which U.S. officials considered key. They did remark that since only they and the United States were capable of putting payloads in orbit that it would be more logical for the two of us to have the dominant roles in any international agreement. This would mean that other nations would then be left to share the remainder of the control of the organization. This implied that veto power would be left in the hands of each of the principals. It was clear that the U.S.S.R. would be an unlikely party to any commercial international communications satellite agreement.

It seems clear that the great success of INTELSAT has been due in large part to the basic principles that were set forth as essential in the early negotiations. An interim agreement was reached in September of 1964, Early Bird was launched in April 1965 and a few years later the Definitive Arrangements which now govern INTELSAT were put into place as of February 1973. The precedent of INTELSAT was key in helping the INMARSAT organization come into being in a later timeframe but good arguments can be made that two separate and similar organizations were and are unnecessary. Technology has fueled the very rapid growth of mobile communications on sea, in the air and on land and the boundaries between fixed and mobile satellites from any point on the globe and 65 centimeter INTELNET terminals access the INTELSAT system. The dramatic coverage of events in the Iraq-Kuwait affair in the center of military action on a large scale was a historic first. It again emphasized the shrinking nature of our world and the demands for immediacy in dealing with issues. It is hard to believe that one of the greatest figures in United States history, Thomas Jefferson, once said of the U.S. Minister to Spain, "I haven't heard from him in two years. If I don't hear from him next year, I shall write him a letter."

Much later a visionary remarked to a colleague at the time of Alexander Graham Bell's invention that it would now be possible for someone in the state of Maine to talk to someone in Texas. His colleague's remark was, "What would anyone in Maine have to say to anyone in Texas?" Then there was the officer in the British Postal Service who observed that the telephone might be of some use in America but that in Great Britain it was unimportant because they had plenty of messenger boys.

A prominent American was incredulous of such a lack of vision and remarked, "I can foresee the day when every significant community in America will have one."

Information is not simply voice, data and television and that is why any discussion of an information revolution is incomplete without including collection, processing and distribution of information. Here satellites have played an even more powerful and vital role. Some other application satellites are key, perhaps more so even than in communications, since some of these tasks can not be accomplished realistically in any other way. Certainly of critical importance is observation from space. This can be of many things, including, of course, weather and earth resources.

The dominant applications, however, from a level of effort point of view, have been in areas related to national security. As Under Secretary of the United States Air Force first under President Eisenhower and later under John Kennedy, we learned of the growing potential of satellites in meeting critical national security needs. In the middle 1950's, the potential feasibility of intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads and the implications thereof threw shock waves into the thinking of policy makers. To make matters worse, intelligence from a variety of sources suggested that the Soviets were embarked on the development of large rocket motor bunch systems and other related technologies, not to mention the rapid progress in nuclear fission and fusion.

The development by the Soviets of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability of carrying thermonuclear warheads, the deployment of such missiles and the total lack of capability to defend against such a threat was a nightmare to U.S. policy makers. Reliability and availability of intelligence information that would permit a reasonable assessment of Soviet efforts and progress was poor. Flyover reconnaissance appeared to offer the best means to achieve critical information. A very unique high altitude aircraft had been developed under Kelly Johnson's direction at Lockheed. It was known as the U-2. Superb optical work had led to the development of a camera that mounted in the U-2 would provide high quality resolution of ground objects, certainly more than adequate for observing equipment of the type that would be needed for an intercontinental ballistic missile capability. President Eisenhower strongly believed that an international agreement on an open skies policy would have a very strong stabilizing effect on world affairs.

Secrecy fostered suspicion and uncertainty drove people and nations into unstable behavior patterns. The consequences of miscalculation in an age of thermonuclear devices were unthinkable. But the adoption of an open skies policy despite Eisenhower's best efforts appeared hopeless. Over flight of the Soviet Union by a U-2 was also uncertain, in that it was a slow aircraft and the full capability of Soviet surface-to-air missiles was unknown. Because of the incalculable cost of misinformation, Eisenhower agreed to a limited number of over flights to seek to gather the critical information needed on the state of the Soviet program to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile. The information gathered was extensive and detailed but also unnerving in its depiction of a very major effort moving rapidly into an operational missile capability at a number of sites, but with no certainty as to how many sites might be involved.

The window closed on the May day when Gary powers was shot down and the much-heralded summit meeting with Khruschev collapsed shortly thereafter in Paris.

Eisenhower was well aware of the hazards of U-2 overflights but the essentiality of the intelligence and the lack of any alternatives had reluctantly led him to authorize the overflights. He had, however, authorized as a high priority research and development effort on a successor aircraft which would fly at much higher altitudes than the U-2 and at three times the speed of sound, which for all practical purposes in the near term would make it incapable of interception. He also set into motion the active exploration of a satellite alternative to the flyover aircraft approach. In the aftermath of the U-2 downing, it was clear that these programs would have to proceed on a highly classified basis to minimize exacerbating an already tense international climate. The successor aircraft emerged as the AF-23 later known as "Blackbird." It incorporated a speed capability of three times that of sound with the first design aimed at minimizing radar cross-section in a major way. These techniques have seen their later application in the Stealth fighter and the B-2 bomber.

The satellite approach proceeded under the guise of a Discover satellite program widely heralded as having as its objective the placing and testing of monkeys in orbit. In fact, however, the satellite was designed to carry a sophisticated camera which could be programmed to photograph desired areas on specific passes and a film package which could be jettisoned after it was fully utilized and recovered as it neared the surface of the ocean attached to its internal parachute by aircraft specially configured to snatch the payload in the air before surface impact. Early efforts were unsuccessful but then one day the storybook script worked to perfection and we had the first high resolution photographs ever taken from a satellite. The results were dramatic in scope and in quality and a new age of reconnaissance by satellite had arrived or, for all practical purposes, an open skies capability with better and more extensive results than President Eisenhower had envisioned.

As in the other areas discussed in this article, major technical improvements have revolutionized the reconnaissance capabilities now available. Broad area reconnaissance at modest resolutions can be added to specific area or specific point coverage at very high resolutions. On-board processing and transmission can provide data on a very current basis and processing and retransmission of selective information can be fed to a user wherever he may be. Modern radar techniques can provide similar observation capabilities on an all-weather basis. The installation of appropriate equipment on board suitably designed satellites permit the gathering of electronic signal intelligence over broad areas and the interception and analysis of communications. Other satellites with infra-red sensors can detect the launching of a rocket and provide not only early warning but information on the characteristics of the rocket launching the vehicle. The specifics and capabilities of actual programs are still classified. One can, however, extrapolate and estimate patterns in much the same way as was discussed in connection with satellite capacity, computer speed and memory density. Suffice it to say that a closed society is nearing the end of its capability to hide from the world.

Earth observation from satellites for information on terrestrial and water resources has been widely discussed. It has clear application not only of interest to agriculturists, environmentalists, oceanographers and the like, but also as might not have been originally considered, to historians, archaeologists and paleontologists. You undoubtedly have read of the discovery of the location of the fabled city of Ubar through a radar imaging system on the space shuttle. The same radar has been used to map ruins along the legendary Silk Road in Northwestern China. More sophisticated radar mapping is contemplated utilizing an upgraded imaging system operating in three different sensing channels to record reflected signals from the ground surface and at two different depths. Radar does not work well when forests and jungles are involved and here multispectral sensors play an important role. Using a thermal mapping camera, different types of information can be obtained, such as changes in plant growth brought about by people or compacted soil as a result of a long-buried trail. Different parts of the infra-red spectrum serve to highlight certain features such as boundaries between different types of vegetation, degrees of soil moisture, different types of minerals and rocks and boundaries between man-made features and crops or plants. The Landsat satellites have showed the promises of such techniques but this satellite program has been beset with lack of definitive policies, direction and funding. Private sources of funding for Landsat type work are limited, at least at the present, in the U.S. The government is clearly the major interested party. At COMSAT we sought to undertake a program that would meet government needs and that could be used to stimulate and develop commercial utilization. We proposed to initiate a long-range definitive program at our cost but sought for the early years some form of guaranteed usage by the government to meet the financial and operational needs which would be involved. We made similar proposals in the meteorological area but without success. The lack of direction, focus and funding has produced many problems in the pursuit of the total potential that such imaging systems possess. The French SPOT system and other national efforts such as the Japanese will, however, add to our knowledge and our experience of the potential of such imaging systems.

There is yet another type of information satellite still to be considered. These are the global positioning satellites. Today the majority of satellites comprising the U.S. Defense department's Global Positioning System are in orbit, some 21 of them. Hand-held commercial GPS receivers can permit the determination of one's location anywhere on the globe to an accuracy of a few meters, suitable for most ordinary purposes. For defense purposes the accuracies that can be achieved are far better. Now, one cannot get lost nor be incommunicado.

Satellite technology, particularly information satellites, broadly defined has provided new capabilities and erased old distinctions such as that between voice and record traffic, between fixed and mobile communications and between image and text. In the course of doing so it disrupts and changes organizational structures and their economics. This creates stress and conflict. Technology forces, however, will always make any artificial boundaries obsolete in time. Those with technical vision will adapt, adjust and refocus. Those who resist change will lose their influence and position. In the same way that a voice communications company, as distinct from a record communications company, no longer makes sense, so boundaries between communication companies and information processing companies now erode. In the U.S. one group was traditionally regulated, the other not. Regulatory oversight and control often erode or deter progress. Regulatory control on the basis of whether one is a domestic service entity or an international service entity also makes less and less sense. We now see in the United States the growing debate between the press and the communications and information companies as to the provision of services to the home. Closely related is debate about the ownership of facilities that connect to the home and the office. Cable television companies view with alarm potential entry into the home or office information and entertainment delivery business by satellite systems or optical fibers owned by the so-called Regional Bell Operating Companies which were created when AT&T was broken up in 1984.

These entities, now known in the U.S. as Baby Bells, plus the Cable TV corporations could thus challenge for an increasing role in television program delivery to homes in the U.S. Meanwhile, the major U.S. television networks and their affiliated stations will see their once dominant role erode. We are in a new world information age with its enormous potential to create a better world. Vision and leadership to ensure that we move into this age with wisdom are in demand. The technology opens the door to freeing something wonderful within the human spirit. It can free the potential of the individual, break down barriers between peoples and help create a new, liberated world order. Perhaps an Arthur C. Clarke Lecturer in 2010 will tell the world of the maturation of the information age we have now entered. It would be most fitting, since Arthur's work and writings have heralded its approach for a long time.

References:

1. C. Mahle and G. Hyde: "Efficiency of Communications Satellites." Presented at the 14th AIM International Communications Satellite Systems Conference, March 26, 1992.

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